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Abstract
Algorithmic game theory (AGT) focuses on the design and
analysis of algorithms for interacting agents, with interactions
rigorously formalized within the framework of games. Results
from AGT find applications in domains such as online bid-
ding auctions for web advertisements and network routing
protocols. Monotone games are games where agent strategies
naturally converge to an equilibrium state. Previous results
in AGT have been obtained for convex, socially-convex, or
smooth games, but not monotone games. Our primary theo-
retical contributions are defining the monotone game setting
and its extension to the online setting, a new notion of regret
for this setting, and accompanying algorithms that achieve
sub-linear regret. We demonstrate the utility of online mono-
tone game theory on a variety of problem domains including
variational inequalities, reinforcement learning, and generative
adversarial networks.
1 Introduction
Algorithmic game theory (AGT) focuses on the design and
analysis of algorithms for agents interacting in games (Nisan
et al. 2007). A game is formalized as follows. At each time
step, t, each agent i selects a strategy, x(i), from a set, X (i),
and incurs a cost, f (i)t (x), where x contains all players’ se-
lected strategies. The welfare of a strategy set is the sum of
all player payoffs, i.e., Wt(x) := −
∑
i f
(i)
t (x). Examples of
games include auctions where bots bid for advertising space
on a webpage and resource allocation games where peers
vie for bandwidth on a network. AGT is typically concerned
with one of two goals: 1) designing sophisticated multi-agent
algorithms that achieve some desired global behavior (e.g.,
maximal welfare) or 2) examining the effect of simple, self-
ish agents on global behaviors. The former is most useful
when one has central control over all the agent algorithms,
while the latter is useful when analyzing more natural agent
algorithms such as gradient descent. In either case, to make
these goals tractable, the design and analysis is restricted to
games with properties that algorithms can exploit.
In this work, we consider repeated-games, wherein agents
have the opportunity to learn and extract information about
the game by playing the game repeatedly. Agents begin play
with no information about the game, and so they cannot be
expected to play optimally from the start. We therefore an-
alyze the regret of an agent (or algorithm), which measures
how poorly an agent performs relative to some baseline. Al-
gorithms that asymptotically achieve an average regret of
zero are called no-regret algorithms.
Several types of repeated-games have been studied, includ-
ing convex, socially-convex, and smooth games. Here, we
consider a new type of game: monotone games. Monotone
games are games where agent strategies naturally converge
to an equilibrium state. Mathematically, the dynamics of
monotone games satisfy a monotonicity property analogous
to convexity in optimization, which, given convexity’s impor-
tance for optimization, lends credence to monotonicity being
a fundamental property of games.
In this work we illuminate the boundaries between mono-
tone games and other well known types of games. We in-
troduce a new performance metric, auto-welfare. We then
show that monotone games are a subset of convex games,
that they facilitate no-regret algorithms for auto-welfare, and
that they need not be socially-convex or smooth. In addition,
we show that auto-welfare is guaranteed even if the rules of
the game change at every time step. To show a few of the
implications of these results for real applications, we perform
an online analysis of the family of GTD algorithms (Sutton,
Maei, and Szepesvári 2009) for reinforcement learning and
derive an affine Wasserstein generative adversarial network
(WGAN) (Arjovsky, Chintala, and Bottou 2017). In summary,
our primary contributions are
• the concept of (online) monotone games,
• the concept of auto-welfare regret, with accompanying
linear bounds,
• algorithms that achieve sublinear auto-welfare regret,
• and examples of a variety of monotone games of interest.
2 Technical Background
Let x˜(i) be the vector of player strategies where player i plays
any x(i) ∈ X (i) and player j 6= i plays x∗(j). Then the vector
of agent strategies, x∗ ∈ X , is a Nash equilibrium if for all i
and all x(i) ∈ X (i), f (i)(x˜(i)) ≥ f (i)(x∗). We denote the set
of all Nash equilibria by X ∗.
We denote the norm of a vector, x, by ||x||, and its dual
norm by ||x||∗ = max{〈x′, x〉 : ||x′|| ≤ 1}. A set is convex
if for all x ∈ X , all x′ ∈ X , and all t ∈ [0, 1], tx+(1−t)x′ ∈
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X . Unless stated otherwise, all sets are assumed to be convex
subsets of Rn.
The subdifferential of a convex function, f : X → R,
at x, denoted ∂f(x), is the set of all subgradients at x, i.e.,
∂f(x) = {z : ∀x′ ∈ X , 〈z, x′ − x〉 ≤ f(x′) − f(x)}.
A function, f , is L-Lipschitz over X if |f(x′) − f(x)| ≤
L||x′−x||, or equivalently, if for all x ∈ X and all z ∈ ∂f(x),
||z||∗ ≤ L. A function, f , is convex if
∀x ∈ X , x′ ∈ X , z ∈ ∂f(x), z′ ∈ ∂f(x′),
〈z − z′, x− x′〉 ≥ 0.1 (1)
Similarly to ∂f , a set valued map, F : X → {Z : Z ⊆
Rn}, maps elements of X to sets of elements in Rn. The set,
Z , need not be convex. A map, F , is L-Lipschitz over X if
for all x ∈ X and all x′ ∈ X , ||F (x′)−F (x)|| ≤ L||x′−x||,
or equivalently, if for all x ∈ X and all z ∈ F (x), ||z||∗ ≤
L. The definition of convexity can be extended to apply to
maps, rather than real-valued functions. This generalization
of convexity is called monotonicity. Formally, a map, F , is
monotone (Aslam Noor 1998) if
∀x ∈ X , x′ ∈ X , z ∈ F (x), z′ ∈ F (x′),
〈z − z′, x− x′〉 ≥ 0. (2)
Alternatively, if F is differentiable and the Jacobian of F is
positive semidefinite (PSD), then F is monotone (Nagurney
and Zhang 1996; Schaible and Luc 1996). A (possibly non-
symmetric) matrix, A, is PSD if for all x ∈ Rn, xTAx ≥ 0,
or equivalently, A is PSD if (A+AT )  0. Although an
abuse of notation, we sometimes write F or ∂f to represent
elements from their respective sets as opposed to the sets
themselves—their use should be clear from the context.
The concept of a path integral is central to this work. A
path (also line or contour) integral is an integral along a
directed, scalar-parameterized path, x : R→ X , from a ∈ X
to b ∈ X , of the inner product between an output of the map
and a differential of the curve, dx, i.e.,∫
x:a b
〈F (x), dx〉 =
∫ 1
0
〈F (x(t)), dx
dt
〉dt (3)
where x(0) = a and x(1) = b. By our definitions,
〈F (x), dx〉 is guaranteed to be integrable over finite length
paths through the domain X . A path is closed if a = b. F
is conservative if the integral along any closed path in X is
zero, i.e.,
∮ 〈F (x), dx〉 = 0.2 Equivalently, F is conservative
if it is path-independent, meaning the integral along any path
between two points in X does not depend on the path itself.
Conversely, if F is path-dependent or ∃x ∈ X such that∮ 〈F (x), dx〉 6= 0, then F is not conservative.
By (1) and (2), the subdifferential of a convex function is a
monotone set valued map, but the converse is not necessarily
true. If F is monotone and conservative, then F is the sub-
differential of some convex function (Romano et al. 1993),
1Convexity is typically presented as f(tx+(1−t)x′) ≤ tf(x)+
(1− t)f(x′), but the form we present better suits the comparison to
monotonicity.
2This is colloquially known as the fundamental theorem of cal-
culus for line integrals.
Figure 1: The sketch on the left represents the gradient map
of a convex function (e.g., x2 + y2), while the sketch on the
right is of a circular vector field and not the gradient of any
function. Both are monotone maps, however, the blue and
red contour integrals in the left sketch are over a conservative
map and so they both evaluate to zero (path-independent). In
contrast, the blue and red contour integrals in the right sketch
are over a non-conservative monotone map and possibly eval-
uate to different values (path-dependent).
however, not all monotone maps are conservative. This shows
that monotone maps are capable of representing problems
not readily captured by convex functions. A more thorough
discussion relating monotone maps to subdifferentials can be
found in the work of Romano et al., (1993).
In Section 5.2 we apply our framework to a variational
inequality (VI) problem, so we introduce VIs here. The vari-
ational inequality problem, VI(F,X ), is to find an x∗ such
that for all x ∈ X , 〈F (x∗), x − x∗〉 ≥ 0. VIs are used to
model equilibrium problems in a number of domains includ-
ing mechanics, traffic networks, economics, and game the-
ory (Facchinei and Pang 2003). Under mild conditions (see
Appendix A.3), x∗ constitutes a Nash equilibrium point. It is
known that the solution set, X ∗, to VI(F,X ) with monotone
F is a convex, compact set (Crouzeix 2016). We refer the
reader to the work of Rockafellar (1969) for a detailed study
of the relationship between convex functions, monotone oper-
ators, and variational inequalities and to that of Nagurney and
Zhang (1999; 1996) and Facchinei and Pang (2003) for an
extensive study of VIs. Geometrically, monotonicity implies
that X ∗ is a global monotone attractor (Nagurney and Zhang
1996). Figure 1 demonstrates a few of the aforementioned
properties of monotonicity.
Online convex optimization (OCO) is a framework for
studying the online learning problem when the loss, ft(x),
is convex with respect to the prediction domain, X , which
is also a convex set. The learning problem is defined in
Algorithm 1. We refer the reader to the survey by Shalev-
Shwartz (2011) for a review of OCO. The standard no-regret
algorithm for OCO is online gradient (mirror) descent; online
gradient descent (OGD) is described in Algorithm 2. The re-
gret of an online learning algorithm, A, predicting sequence,
Algorithm 1 Online Convex Optimization (OCO)
input: A convex set X
for all t = 1, 2, . . . do
predict a vector xt ∈ X
receive a convex loss function ft : X → R
suffer loss ft(xt)
end for
Algorithm 2 Online Gradient Descent (OGD)
input: A scalar learning rate η > 0
x1 = 0
for all t = 1, 2, . . . do
xt+1 = xt − ηzt where zt ∈ ∂ft(xt)
end for
xt, after T steps, is formally defined as
regretTA(X ) =
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)−min
u∈X
T∑
t=1
ft(u) (4)
≤
T∑
t=1
〈zt, xt − uT 〉, zt ∈ ∂ft(xt), (5)
where uT = arg minu∈X
∑T
t=1 ft(u), and (5) provides an
upper bound to the regret that is linear in xt.
Assuming each ft is Lt-Lipschitz, X = {x : ||x||2 ≤
B}, and η = B
L
√
2T
, it has been shown that (5) implies that
regretTOGD ≤ BL
√
2T where L2 ≥ 1T
∑T
t=1 L
2
t (Shalev-
Shwartz 2011).
3 Online Monotone Games & Auto-Welfare
In this section, we define monotone games and auto-welfare.
Definition 1 (Monotone Game). A game is monotone if
the map, F : X → Rn, formed by concatenating the
subgradients of all N player cost functions, f (i)(x), is
monotone. More concretely, let F = [z(1), . . . , z(N)] where
z(i) ∈ ∂x(i)f (i) is any subgradient of f (i) w.r.t. x(i). A game
is monotone if F satisfies (2).
Essentially, a game is monotone if gradient descent with an
infinitesimally small step size, e.g., GIGA (Zinkevich 2003),
does not cause the player strategies to diverge away from the
equilibrium point. In online monotone games, an adversary
may choose a new monotone game for the players to play at
every time step, i.e., f (i)(x) becomes f (i)t (x).
We begin our discussion of regret with a trivial applica-
tion of online optimization to games. Online optimization
provides theory for bounding the regret of an algorithm’s
prediction, xt, when comparing to a baseline, uT , chosen
in retrospect. In other words, if we were to go back in time
and play this baseline against the same exact sequence of
environments, how much better would we do? To measure
this, we can sum up the differences between the algorithm’s
loss and the baseline loss at each time step, t, as in (4).
Figure 2: Illustrative comparison of auto-welfare to a game-
agnostic loss. Online optimization provides theory for regret
measured only along the edges of the square (axis aligned),
while online monotone optimization additionally measures
regret along diagonals (any line).
ot
uT
xt
Figure 3: Illustrative comparison of two-step,
∫ xt
ot
− ∫ uT
ot
, to
one-step regret,
∫ xt
uT
.
In order to use this theory in a game, we simply focus
our attention on one player and treat the rest of the players
as part of the adversarial environment. In this way, online
optimization can provide regret bounds for each player if
we imagine replaying the game but with all other players
forced to replay the same actions as before. This is largely
unsatisfying given that it seems to have taken the game as-
pect out of the game. Ideally, our regret measure would leave
the game environment intact and allow all players to change
their actions. In this regard, welfare regret is far more sat-
isfying because it measures the sum of all player payoffs
with respect to a baseline that allows all players to change
their actions. Unfortunately, bounding welfare regret often
requires properties like smoothness.
As a compromise, we propose auto-welfare. Consider
player 1 in an N -player game. Player 1 receives a payoff
or reward for changing her strategy, however, her reward de-
pends on all other player adjustments as well. Player 1 never
knows how the other N−1 players are going to change their
strategies, so it is reasonable for her to measure the portion
of her reward that is due to her strategy change alone. Such
a measurement provides valuable feedback on her decision
to update her strategy, and this measurement is exactly what
auto-welfare sums for all players. Therefore, auto-welfare
can be thought of as measuring how “satisfied” the players as
a whole are with their decision making given that they only
have control over themselves. In contrast, welfare measures
how “satisfied” the players as a whole are with the outcome
of the game.
We can compute auto-welfare, W a, with a path integral,
W at (xt) = W
a
ot +
∫
x:ot→xt
〈−Ft(x), dx〉, (6)
where Ft(x) is an output of the game map (see Defini-
tion 1), ot is any reference vector with known auto-welfare,
W aot , and x : ot → xt is the straight line path from ot
to xt through X . Figure 2 illustrates the flexibility auto-
welfare provides over the game-agnostic loss provided by
online optimization theory. This formulation has been con-
sidered for converting symmetric VIs into equivalent opti-
mization problems (Aghassi, Bertsimas, and Perakis 2006;
Hu and Wang 2006), however, to our knowledge has not been
leveraged for asymmetric VIs, which represent a wider class
of games.
We can rewrite auto-welfare as follows to reveal its rela-
tionship to standard welfare, W .
W at (xt) = W
a
ot +
∫
x:ot→xt
〈−Ft(x), dx〉 (7)
= W aot +
N∑
i=1
∫
x:ot→xt
〈−∂f (i)t,i (x), dx(i)〉 (8)
= W (xt)−
N∑
i=1
N∑
j 6=i
∫
x:ot→xt
〈−∂f (i)t,j (x), dx(j)〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
i’s reward due to j’s strategy change
(9)
where ∂f (i)t,j (x) is a subgradient of agent i’s expected loss
function with respect to agent j’s strategy, x(j)t , evaluated
at x. Therefore, W at (xt) gives welfare minus the rewards
resulting from intra-team inefficiencies. We call this auto-
welfare because it sums the portions of the player’s welfare
that can be attributed to its own strategy.
3.1 Online Monotone Optimization
We are now ready to present a framework for Online Mono-
tone Optimization (Algorithm 3: OMO) that will enable us to
derive lower bounds for auto-welfare regret in online mono-
tone games. Let ft(xt) = −W at (xt) be the path integral loss.
Algorithm 3 Online Monotone Optimization (OMO)
input: A convex set X ⊆ Rn
for all t = 1, 2, . . . do
predict a vector xt ∈ X
receive a monotone map, Ft, with
reference vector, ot, and reference scalar, fot
suffer ft(xt) = −W at (xt) as defined in (6)
end for
Comparing OMO to OCO, we see that the major difference
is that we now receive a loss function implicitly defined
by a monotone map whereas in OCO, we receive a convex
loss function directly. In some cases, OMO reduces to OCO,
however, this is not always the case, so we cannot rely on
OCO theory alone to bound auto-welfare. In general, OMO
represents a strict superset of OCO (see Appendix A.4).
Theorem 1. OCO(ft,X ) is equivalent to OMO(∂ft,X ) and
∃Ft such that OMO(Ft,X ) 6∈ {∀ft OCO(ft,X )} implying
OCO ⊂ OMO in the strict sense.
However, if F is affine, OMO is equivalent to OCO (see
Appendix A.5).
Theorem 2. If Ft(xt) = Axt + b and A is PSD, then
OMO(Ft,X ) is equivalent to OCO(ft,X ).
Next, we revisit the definition of regret given by (4). Two
definitions of regret naturally arise in the OMO framework.
Both notions are equivalent to (4) in the OCO setting (i.e.,
1-player monotone games). In the following discussion, we
refer to
∫
x:a→b〈Ft(x), dx〉 with the shorthand
∫ b
a
; note that
this measures how much worse strategy set b is relative to a.
Please consult Figure 3 for a visual during this discussion.
Two-step regret compares the loss of the online learning
strategy to the loss of the best fixed strategy in retrospect
(
∫ xt
ot
− ∫ uT
ot
). One-step regret represents the loss felt when
converting the best fixed strategy to the online learning strat-
egy (
∫ xt
uT
). While these two notions are equivalent in OCO,
they are possibly different in OMO due to path-dependence
of general monotone maps. We opt for one-step regret as it
lacks any direct dependence on ot. First we provide a useful
integral upper bound over monotone maps (see Remark 3.10
in the work of Romano et al. (1993) for a formal proof).
Lemma 1 (Path Integral Bound). The path integral over a
monotone map is bounded by its linear approximations, i.e.,
〈F (a), b− a〉 ≤ ∫
x:a→b〈F, dx〉 ≤ 〈F (b), b− a〉.
Using this, we can immediately derive linear upper bounds
for two-step and one-step regret as follows:
regret2 =
∫ xt
ot
−
∫ uT
ot
≤ 〈F (xt), xt − ot〉 − 〈F (ot), uT − ot〉, (10)
regret1 =
∫ xt
uT
≤ 〈F (xt), xt − uT 〉
≤ 〈F (xt), xt − ot〉 − 〈F (xt), uT − ot〉. (11)
Unfortunately, we cannot simplify the difference between the
latter terms, 〈F (xt)−F (ot), uT −ot〉, and so it is not clear if
one of these regrets upper bounds the other. However, we can
bound the difference between the two regrets using Stokes’
theorem and bounds on F and its derivatives. The difference
between the two regrets is equal to the magnitude of the path
integral around the triangle in Figure 3. By Stokes’ theorem,
|
∮
∂Σ
〈F, dx〉| = |
∫
Σ
∇× F · dΣ| ≤ max
Σ
||∇ × F || ·
∫
Σ
dA
≤ 2
√
2(β2 + Lγ) · (Area of4) (12)
where L, β, and γ are bounds on F , the Jacobian of F , and
a matrix of 2nd derivates respectively and Σ (∂Σ) is the 2-
dimensional area (perimeter) formed by the path around the
triangle,4 (see Appendix A.8 for proof).
We summarize the new definitions and bounds using
regret1 here for convenience.
regret(t,T )A (X ) =
∫
x:uT→xt
〈Ft(x), dx〉
≤ 〈Ft(xt), xt〉 − 〈Ft(xt), uT 〉 (13)
regretTA(X ) =
T∑
t=1
regret(t,T )A (X ) (14)
uT = arg min
u∈X
T∑
t=1
∫
x:ot→u
〈Ft(x), dx〉 (15)
3.2 Derivation of No-Regret Algorithms for OMO
Due to the simplicity of the instantaneous regret bounds dis-
cussed in the previous section and the work previously done
in OCO, the derivation of no-regret algorithms for OMO is
trivial. We have shown that instantaneous regret for general
monotone maps can be bounded above by considering the
constant approximation of the map in (13). Note that a con-
stant map, Ft(xt), is always the subgradient of some linear
function, ft(x) = 〈Ft(xt), x〉. This implies that the regret for
general monotone maps is bounded above by considering the
online linear optimization problem with ft(x). This reduc-
tion mirrors that of OCO, where convex losses are bounded
above by their linear approximations. The implication is that
the online gradient decent and even online mirror descent
algorithms can be adapted from OCO with almost no effort
to minimize regret in OMO while enjoying exactly the same
o(T ) regret bounds (see end of Section 2 and Appendix A.7).
This is somewhat surprising as Theorem 1 indicates that
OMO sometimes involves minimizing non-convex functions.
The no-regret algorithms for OMO are given in Algorithms 4
and 5.
Note that OMO defines ft(xt) = −W at (xt). No-regret
algorithms for OMO minimize an upper bound on regret as
defined in (14) which immediately translates into a lower
bound for auto-welfare regret. Therefore, Algorithms 4 and 5
equivalently maximize a lower bound for auto-welfare.
Assuming each Ft is Lt-Lipschitz, X = {x : ||x||2 ≤ B},
and η = B
L
√
2T
, it directly follows from (Shalev-Shwartz
2011) that regretTOMoMD(X ) ≤ BL
√
2T where L2 ≥
1
T
∑T
t=1 L
2
t . Moreover, if ot = xt−1, then the difference
between regret1 and regret2 is bounded by (12), which de-
cays at O(T−1/2). In this case, both average regret2 and
average regret1 go to zero in the limit, T →∞, i.e., (Area of
4) ≤ 12 ||xt − xt−1|| · ||xt − uT || ≤ 12 (ηL)(2B) = B
2√
2T
.
3.3 Summary
A monotone game is a game where the map formed by con-
catenating all player gradients is a monotone map. Auto-
welfare measures the portion of the players’ welfare that can
be attributed to their own strategy and provides a sense of
how “satisfied” the players are with their decision making.
Moreover, auto-welfare can be computed as a path integral
over a monotone game map and is lower bounded by a lin-
ear approximation (see Lemma 1). The Online Monotone
Algorithm 4 Online Monotone Descent (OMoD)
input: A scalar learning rate η > 0
x1 = 0
for all t = 1, 2, . . . do
xt+1 = xt − ηzt where zt ∈ Ft(xt)
end for
Algorithm 5 OMoMirrorD (OMoMD)
input: A link function g : Rn → X
x1 = g(0)
for all t = 1, 2, . . . do
θt+1 = θt − ηzt where zt ∈ Ft(xt)
xt = g(θt+1)
end for
Optimization framework formalizes the problem of maxi-
mizing auto-welfare in an environment where the game it-
self may change at each step. In a “changing game”, player
losses/utilities may be arbitrarily changed as long as the re-
sulting game is still monotone. This is equivalent to arbitrarily
removing, substituting, and/or adding players at each step.
By leveraging OCO theory, we show that natural gradient
descent dynamics (OMoMD) ensure sublinear average auto-
welfare regret even in this extreme scenario.
4 AGT Background and Related Work
Monotone games and socially-convex games are both subsets
of convex games (see Theorems 7 and 8 in Appendix A.9).
Convex games are games in which each agent’s cost func-
tion, f (i)(x), is convex with respect to its own strategy,
x(i). Gordon, Greenwald, and Marks (2008) studied internal
and external regret for individual agents in convex games
and related these to convergence towards correlated and
coarse-correlated equilibria respectively. Note that in gen-
eral, these results on equilibria do not imply results for wel-
fare. Even-Dar, Mansour, and Nadav (2009) examined no-
regret algorithms in socially-concave games (equivalently
formulated as socially-convex games), and showed that each
player’s average strategy approaches that player’s strategy
at the Nash equilibrium; also, each player’s average util-
ity approaches that player’s utility at the Nash equilibrium.
Roughgarden (2009) developed the notion of smooth games.
Smoothness relates the convergence of strategies towards
Nash equilibria to the price of anarchy (PoA), which defines
the ratio of the worst-case sum cost of a Nash equilibrium,
maxx∗∈X∗ −W (x∗), to the best-case sum cost of a player
strategy set, minx∈X −W (x). In short, smoothness relates
no-regret dynamics to the welfare of a game. Table 1 outlines
the intersections between the various game types.
Additional performance gains can be obtained if we can
assume each player in the game is employing an algorithm
from a given class. Syrgkanis et al. (2015) have accelerated
Type / Ex. a b c d e f g h i
Smooth
√ √ √ √ √
Convex
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Monotone
√ √ √ √
Socially-Convex
√ √ √ √
Table 1: Games may share multiple properties at once. Defi-
nitions of properties and examples for each case (denoted by
the column heading) are given in Appendix A.9.
convergence to Nash equilibria, to zero-regret, and to optimal
welfare (assuming the game is smooth) under this scenario.
An extension of this work also considers scenarios where the
game is changing at each time step (Lykouris, Syrgkanis, and
Tardos 2016). Specifically, Foster et al. (2016) showed that
approximate optimality can be guaranteed if the game allows
players to be replaced with probability p for small p. More-
over, this is true even when the players observe only bandit
feedback (as opposed to expected costs) when comparing
against a dynamic baseline. Critically, bounds on welfare are
still derived from a smoothness constraint on the game.
As a whole, the game properties discussed above (convex,
socially-convex, smooth), focus on player costs. In contrast,
we examine monotone games where monotonicity is a prop-
erty of game dynamics—in other words, a property of the
player algorithms that are employed. However, in this paper,
when we refer to a game as monotone, we are stating that the
game dynamics associated with all players running gradient
descent with the same learning rate parameter are monotone.
We defer progress into understanding more general monotone
algorithms to future research.
5 Applications
We illustrate applications of online monotone game theory
on modeling several concave games, solving an online vari-
ational inequality problem (OVI), uncovering insights into
a saddle-point based reinforcement learning algorithm, and
designing a generative adversarial network (GAN), a game-
based generative model, with auto-welfare regret guarantees.
5.1 Concave Games
Even-Dar, Mansour, and Nadav (2009) developed the theory
of socially-concave games and showed that minor simplifi-
cations of a number of concave games are socially-concave
as well. In Appendix A.10, we show that variants of these
games also satisfy monotonicity. Specifically, we prove F is
monotone for the following games:
• Linear Cournot Competition (Cournot 1838)—Firms com-
pete for consumers by adjusting quantities of goods pro-
duced. The price of goods is set by a linear function of the
total quantity of goods in the market.
• Linear Resource Allocation (Johari and Tsitsiklis
2004)—A network controller oversees the sharing of a
communication channel, ensuring total communication
does not exceed the network capacity. Users submit bids
to the controller, which the controller uses when deciding
how to allocate capacity. User value functions are linear.
• Congestion Control Protocols (Even-Dar, Mansour, and
Nadav 2009)—We consider a Tail Drop policy where a
router drops packets that exceed the network capacity.
In Appendix A.10, we analyze resource allocation and
compare welfare with auto-welfare. In this case, welfare is
maximized when all users submit the minimum bid amount.
This result is independent of the parameters of the users’
utility functions, which from a modeling viewpoint is un-
satisfying. In contrast, auto-welfare is maximized by bids
with an intuitive dependence on the utility function parame-
ters: 1) as the penalty for large bids grows, the optimal bid
amount decreases; 2) as the number of users increases, the
optimal bid amount increases (due to increased competition),
approaching an asymptote.
5.2 A Machine Learning Economy
Next, we consider a cloud-based machine learning network
(MLN) adopted from (Nagurney and Wolf 2014). Providers
of machine learning data control the quantity of data provided
while network providers control the delivery price as well
as service quality. Consumers influence the network through
demand functions dictating the prices they are willing to pay
for specific quantities and qualities of services rendered. See
Appendix A.11 for a more thorough description.
We define each firm’s utility function to be concave and
quadratic in its strategy. This establishes the equivalence
between the equilibrium state we are searching for and the
variational inequality to be solved, V I(Ft,R+), where Ft
returns a vector consisting of the negative gradients of the
utility functions for each firm.
To cast this VI as an online learning problem, we let the pa-
rameters of the network change. This creates a more realistic
model as a number of external factors can cause the network
to change such as complex network congestion effects, cyber
attacks, etc. The goal then is to predict the equilibrium point
of each new MLN in the face of these possibly adversarial
forces. Specifically, our experiment considers ten different
five-firm networks with monotone Ft. At each time step, the
adversary receives OMoD’s prediction for the equilibrium
point and returns the MLN whose equilibrium is farthest from
the predicted one. The reference vectors, ot, are the previous
strategy sets, xt−1. The reference constants, ft(ot), are all
assumed to be zero without loss of generality.
Computing the optimal strategy uT is prohibitive in gen-
eral (15). We cannot even say that uT lies in the convex hull
of the individual equilibria, x∗t , due to ft = −W at being
possibly non-convex. Instead, we approximate uT with the
equilibrium of the network created from averaging the ten
together, x¯∗. We measure two regrets throughout the learn-
ing process. The first is an approximation of auto-welfare
regret using regret1, and the second uses regret2. Figure 4
plots the average of these measures with respect to the time
step, demonstrating that both average auto-welfare regrets
approach zero in support of our derived sublinear bounds.
5.3 GTD Algorithms
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a class of learning prob-
lems in which an agent attempts to maximize a long-term
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Figure 4: Demonstration of OMoMD on described machine
learning network. Note that regret1 and regret2 fall within the
light blue region predicted by the Stokes bound in (12).
reward in an unfamiliar environment by reinforcing reward-
ing behaviors. Solving this problem typically requires first
learning a value function, V pi(s), which gives the long-term
reward the agent is expected to receive if employing policy
pi and starting from state s. Often, we learn an approximate
value function instead, V piθ (s), parameterized by θ ∈ Rd. Ap-
proximating V piθ (s) by observing an exploratory policy, pi
′,
is called off-policy policy evaluation. The gradient temporal
difference (GTD) algorithms form a family of algorithms for
accomplishing this task (Sutton, Maei, and Szepesvári 2009;
Sutton et al. 2009).
Liu et al. (2015) showed that although the family of gradi-
ent temporal difference (GTD) algorithms are technically not
gradient algorithms with respect to their original objectives,
they are gradient algorithms with respect to a saddle point
objective, which is an example of a 2-player game. We show
that this game is strongly monotone (see Appendix A.12).
The GTD update rules are given by
yt+1 = yt + αt(b−Aθt −Myt) (16)
θt+1 = θt + αt(A
T yt) (17)
where M = 1d or M is a covariance matrix. These updates
are equivalent to running OMoD on an appropriate 2-player
game. Either way, M is symmetric positive definite and the
corresponding map, F , is strongly monotone with parameter
1 for M = 1d, or more generally, λmin(M).
The corresponding path integral loss that GTD bounds is
f([y; θ]) =
1
2
(yTMy − yT0 My0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
y-growth
− yT (b−Aθ0) + yT0 (b−Aθ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
y-alignment
(18)
In the GTD algorithms, y was originally introduced as
an auxiliary variable to estimate E[ρδφ] = b − Aθ. If we
let θ0 = θ, and both y-growth<0 and y-alignment>0, this
means that y is a better estimate of b − Aθ than y0. This
is reassuring because it means that the GTD algorithms are
ensuring a bound on the error of this estimate. Accurately
estimating b−Aθ was key to deriving the GTD algorithms,
however, this was motivated out of intuition. We hope this
perspective provides a stronger mathematical explanation as
well as bounds on the estimation error.
5.4 Affine Wasserstein GANs
Generative adversarial networks formulate the training of a
generative model as a game (Goodfellow et al. 2014). The
original formulation is a minimax game between a generator,
G(z) : z → x, and a discriminator, D(x) : x→ [0, 1],
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) = Ex∼pdata(x)
[
log(D(x))
]
+ Ez∼pz(z)
[
log(1−D(G(z)))
]
, (19)
where pdata(x) is the true data distribution and pz(z) is a sim-
ple (usually fixed) distribution that is easy to draw samples
from (e.g., N (0, 1)).
Unfortunately, this game is not monotone in general, how-
ever, we can derive a monotone version of the Wasserstein-
type GAN (Arjovsky, Chintala, and Bottou 2017) with online
guarantees using regret1. The new minimax objective is
min
G
max
d
V (G, d) = Ex∼pdata(x) [d
Tx]− Ez∼pz(z)[dTGz]
(20)
where x ∈ Rn, z ∈ Rm, d ∈ Rn, G ∈ Rn×m. We derive the
map, F , associated with this game in Appendix A.13 (299).
F is monotone for any pz(z) and pdata(x). If G and d are
regularized with α2 || · ||22, then F is strongly monotone with
parameter α.
In Appendix A.14, we show that for any differentiable,
convex-concave minimax game, the corresponding path inte-
gral loss that Algorithms 4 and 5 bound is
f([G; d]) = V (G, d0)− V (G0, d). (21)
If we let d0 = d, then this loss is minimized if G tricks d
better than G0 tricks d; i.e., the generator, G, is an improve-
ment over G0. Alternatively, if we let G0 = G, then this
loss models how much the discriminator, d, has improved
over d0. Furthermore, if (d0, G0)=(d∗, G∗), i.e. the minimax
solution, then f is a familiar Lyapunov function for the game.
6 Conclusion & Future Work
We proposed a new framework for online learning, namely
Online Monotone Optimization, which enables the study of
auto-welfare regret for online monotone games. This frame-
work generalizes the popular Online Convex Optimization
framework in a way that allows it to model regret for multi-
ple agents in parallel while still retaining the simplicity of
standard no-regret algorithms from previous work. We sup-
port the efficacy of our new framework with connections
to network congestion protocols, empirical results from a
VI, analysis of an existing RL algorithm, and design of a
generative model.
In future work, we hope to develop the framework further
to handle dynamic regret. We also hope to develop efficient
algorithms for approximating the optimal strategy uT in ret-
rospect.
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A Appendix
A.1 Monotonicity in Integral Form
A proof sketch for Lemma 1.
Proof. Let xi+1−xi = xn−x0n ∀ x0, xn and recall the definition of monotonicity, 〈F (xi+1)−F (xi), xi+1−xi〉 ≥ 0 ∀ xi, xi+1
which implies
〈F (xi), xn − x0
n
〉 ≤ 〈F (xi+1), xn − x0
n
〉 (22)
which implies
〈F (xi), xn − x0
n
〉 ≤ 〈F (xj), xn − x0
n
〉 ∀ j ≥ i. (23)
Also,
〈F (x0), xn − x0〉 = 〈F (x0),
n−1∑
i=0
xn − x0
n
〉 (24)
=
n−1∑
i=0
〈F (x0), xn − x0
n
〉 (25)
≤
n−1∑
i=0
〈F (xi), xn − x0
n
〉 (26)
=
∫
x:x0→xn
〈F, dx〉 as n→∞, (27)
and vice versa for the reverse direction, which implies
=⇒ 〈F (x0), xn − x0〉 ≤
∫
x:x0→xn
〈F, dx〉 (28)
≤ 〈F (xn), xn − x0〉. (29)
A.2 Pseudo-monotonicity in Integral Form
Definition 2 (Pseudo-monotone). F is pseudo-monotone if the following one-way implication holds for all x, y ∈ K: 〈F (x), y−
x〉 ≥ 0 =⇒ 〈F (y), y − x〉 ≥ 0.
Lemma 2. If F is pseudo-monotone, F also obeys the following one-way implication
〈F (x), y − x〉 ≥ 0 =⇒
∫
z:x→y
〈F (z), dz〉 ≥ 0 (30)
Proof. Assume 〈F (x), y − x〉 ≥ 0 and let ∆z = y−xn . Then
〈F (x), y − x〉 = 〈F (x), y − x
n
〉 · n (31)
= 〈F (x),∆z〉 · n (32)
≥ 0 (33)
=⇒ 〈F (x), i∆z〉 ≥ 0 ∀ i ≥ 0 (34)
Let i∆z = (x+ i∆z)− x = yˆi − x.
〈F (x), i∆z〉 ≥ 0 ∀ i ≥ 0 (35)
=⇒ 〈F (x), yˆi − x〉 ≥ 0 ∀ i ≥ 0 (36)
=⇒ 〈F (yˆi), yˆi − x〉 ≥ 0 ∀ i ≥ 0 (37)
=⇒ 〈F (yˆi), i∆z〉 ≥ 0 ∀ i ≥ 0 (38)
=⇒ 〈F (yˆi),∆z〉 ≥ 0 ∀ i ≥ 0 (39)
=⇒
n∑
i=0
〈F (yˆi),∆z〉 ≥ 0 (40)
where ∆z = ∆z(n) (41)
=⇒ lim
n→∞
n∑
i=0
〈F (yˆi),∆z〉 ≥ 0 (42)
=
∫
z:x→y
〈F (z), dz〉 ≥ 0 (43)
A.3 Nash Equilibrium vs VI Solution
Theorem 3. Repeated from (Cavazzuti, Pappalardo, and Passacantando 2002). Let (C,K) be a cost minimization game with
player cost functions Ci and feasible set K. Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium. Let F = [∂C1∂x1 , . . . ,
∂CN
∂xN
]. Then
〈F (x∗), x− x∗〉 ≥ 0 (44)
∀x ∈ ({x∗ + IK(x∗)} ∩K) ⊆ K (45)
where IK(x∗) is the internal cone at x∗. When Ci(xi,x−i) is pseudo-convex in xi for all i, this condition is also sufficient.
A.4 Theorem 1: OCO ⊂ OMO
Let the feasible set, X , and field, F (x), be defined as follows.
x = [r, c] ∈ X ≡ [0, 1]2 (46)
F (x) =
(
r2+2rc+c2
−2r2+2rc+c2
)
(47)
In addition, we set the reference vector, o, to the origin, [0, 0]. We set the reference scalar, f(o), to 0 without loss of generality.
F is monotone over X = [0, 1]2
J(F ) =
(
2r+2c 2r+2c
−4r+2c 2r+2c
)
(48)
Js(F ) =
1
2
(J + JT ) =
(
2r+2c 2c−r
2c−r 2r+2c
)
(49)
det(Js) = 3r
2 + 12rc ≥ 0 ∀ [r, c] ∈ X (50)
τ(Js) = 4r + 4c ≥ 0 ∀ [r, c] ∈ X (51)
=⇒ Js(F )  0. (52)
The trace and determinant of the (2× 2 matrix) symmetrized Js are both non-negative, which imply the eigenvalues of Js are
non-negative. Therefore, F is monotone.
f is non-convex over X = [0, 1]2
f(x) = fo +
∫
z:o→x
〈F, dz〉 (53)
=
∫ 1
0
〈F (o+ τ(x− o)), (x− o)dτ〉 (54)
=
∫ 1
0
〈F (τx), x〉dτ (55)
=
1
3
(r3 + 3rc2 + c3) (56)
H(f) =
(
2r 2c
2c 2r+2c
)
(57)
det(H) = 4(r2 + rc− c2) < 0 (58)
∀ {[r, c] | [r, c] ∈ X , c >
√
5 + 1
2
r} (59)
=⇒ H 0. (60)
This means f forms a saddle surface over a compact subset of X , therefore, it is non-convex. In fact, f is not even quasi-convex.
For example, let x0 = [0, 0.8], xf = [0.5, 0.45] and consider their midpoint, then
f(
x0 + xf
2
)  max{f(x0), f(xf )}. (61)
A.5 Theorem 2: OMO ≡ OCO for Positive semidefinite Affine Maps
This concerns such problems as linear complementarity problems (LCPs).
Ft(xt) = Axt + b, (62)
where xt, b, ot ∈ Rn, A  0 ∈ Rn×n (63)
ft(xt)− fot = (64)
=
∫
x:ot→xt
〈Ft, dx〉 (65)
=
∫ 1
0
〈Ft(ot + τ(xt − ot)), (xt − ot)dτ〉 (66)
=
∫ 1
0
〈A(ot + τ(xt − ot)) + b, (xt − ot)dτ〉 (67)
=
∫ 1
0
〈Aot + τA(xt − ot) + b, (xt − ot)dτ〉 (68)
=
∫ 1
0
〈Aot + b, (xt − ot)dτ〉
+ τ〈A(xt − ot), (xt − ot)dτ〉 (69)
= 〈Aot + b, (xt − ot)〉
+
1
2
〈A(xt − ot)), (xt − ot)〉 (70)
= oTt A
Txt − oTt AT ot + bT (xt − ot)
+
1
2
(xt − ot)TAT (xt − ot) (71)
= oTt A
Txt − oTt AT ot + bT (xt − ot)
1
2
[xTt A
Txt − oTt ATxt − xTt AT ot + oTt AT ot] (72)
=
1
2
[xTt A
Txt + x
T
t (A−AT )ot − oTt AT ot] + bT (xt − ot) (73)
=
1
2
[xTt
(A+AT
2
)
xt + x
T
t (A−AT )ot − oTt AT ot] + bT (xt − ot) (74)
(75)
Hessian(ft) =
1
2
[A+AT ]  0 =⇒ ft is convex (76)
This also implies that every multivariate function with nonzero Hessian can be represented by an infinite number of fields (other
than the gradient), specifically any field whose symmetric component equals A+A
T
2 .
A.6 Monotone Optimization with o = x∗
Here, we consider the case where the reference point is the solution to the corresponding variational inequality problem,
o = x∗ = V I(F,X ). Remember, this means x∗ is an equilibrium point of the field, F , and has the property
〈F (x∗), z − x∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ X . (77)
MoMD solves MO when o = x∗
Theorem 4. If o is a solution to V I(F,X ) where F : X → Rn is a monotone (or at least pseudo-monotone) map and X is a
convex set, then o is a global minimizer of the monotone optimization problem with map F , reference vector o, and any reference
scalar fot .
Proof. Without loss of generality, let f(o) = 0.
∇x
{∫
z:o→x
〈F (z), dz〉
}∣∣∣
x=o
= (78)
= ∇x
{∫
t:0→1
〈F (o+ t(x− o)), x− o〉dt
}∣∣∣
x=o
(79)
=
∫
t:0→1
{
F (o+ t(x− o))+ (80)
J(o+ t(x− o))T (x− o)tdt
}∣∣∣
x=o
(81)
=
∫
t:0→1
{
F (o)
}
(82)
= F (o) (83)
A necessary first order condition for optimality is
〈F (o), z − o〉 ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ X , (84)
which by the definition of the variational inequality problem is solved by o = x∗. Reversing this result
f(o) = 0 ≤ 〈F (o), z − o〉 ≤
∫
x:o→z
〈F (x), dx〉 = f(x) (85)
reveals that o = x∗ is also a global minimum.
This directly implies that the Projection Method (MoMD with R = 12 ||x2||) converges exponentially fast to a minimum of the
MO loss for strongly monotone fields.
Note that the optimality proof also carries through for pseudo-monotone fields (see A.2).
f(o) = 0 ≤ 〈F (o), z − o〉 (86)
=⇒ 0 ≤
∫
x:o→z
〈F (x), dx〉 = f(x) (87)
which reveals that o = x∗ is also a global minimum of the pseudo-monotone loss.
A.7 OMoD & OMoMD Regret Bounds
We repeat the bounds adopted from (Shalev-Shwartz 2011) for convenience.
Theorem 5. Let R be a (1/η)-strongly-convex function over X with respect to a norm || · ||. Assume that OMoMD is run on the
sequence of monotone maps, Ft, with the link function
g(θ) = arg max
x∈X
(〈x, θ〉 −R(x)). (88)
Then, for all u ∈ X ,
regretOMoMDT (X ) ≤ R(uT )−minv∈X R(v) + η
T∑
t=1
||zt||2∗ (89)
Furthermore, if Ft is Lt-Lipschitz with respect to || · ||, then we can further upper bound ||zt||∗ ≤ Lt.
Proof. As we have shown previously,
regretA(t,T )(X ) =
∫
x:uT→xt
〈Ft, dx〉 (90)
≤ 〈Ft(xt), xt〉 − 〈Ft(xt), uT 〉 (91)
and the OMoMD algorithm is equivalent to running Follow the Regularized Leader (FoReL) on the sequence of linear functions
with the regularization R(x). The theorem now follows directly from Theorem 2.11 and Lemma 2.6 in (Shalev-Shwartz
2011).
OMoD is equivalent to OMoMD with R(x) = 12 ||x||22 and so the proof for OMoMD extends to OMoD as well.
A.8 Curl Bound
The proof outline is as follows. The triangle in Figure 3 defines a 2-d plane in an n-dimensional ambient space. We are interested
in the path integral around the triangle. Each element of the path integral consists of an inner product of the field F with a
differential vector along the curve. Any components of F that are orthogonal to this differential vector evaluate to zero. The
triangle is 2-d hence, its perimeter is 2-d, which means we may consider a projection of F , F:2, onto the 2-d plane defined by the
triangle. We can think of this projection as a rotation of F , FR = R · F , followed by a projection in which we extract the first
2-dimensions of F:2 = Π∆(FR). The curl is defined for 3-d so we will actually append a third dimension whose component is
identically zero. Define F ′ to be this augmented projection of the field. Also, let J be the Jacobian of a vector field F (an n× n
square matrix) and J2 be a matrix of the same size but with second derivatives. Concretely,
Jij(F ) =
∂Fi
∂xj
J2ij(F ) =
∂2Fi
∂x2j
. (92)
Define J (2) to be the 2nd principal submatrix of J , meaning the top left 2 block submatrix of J . Also, we define the following
matrix norms
||A||F =
(∑
i
∑
j
|Aij |2
)1/2
(93)
||A||2 =
√
λmax(A∗A) = σmax(A) (94)
||A||2,1 =
∑
j
(∑
i
|Aij |2
)1/2
=
∑
j
||A·j ||2 (95)
||A||max = max
ij
|Aij | (96)
which obey the following inequalities
||A||max ≤ ||A||2 ≤ ||A||F ≤ n||A||max. (97)
The following Lemmas are useful for the proof. We also define the following scalar values: L, β, γ.
Lemma 3. ||F ′||2 = ||F:2||2 ≤ ||FR||2 ≤ ||F ||2 = L.
Proof.
||F ′||2 = ||F:2||2 because F ′ is simply F:2 augmented with a zero (98)
≤ ||FR||2 because the projection Π∆ simply drops entries (99)
= ||RF ||2 by definition (100)
≤ ||R||2||F ||2 because the L2 matrix norm is submultiplicative (101)
= ||F ||2 because the spectral norm of rotation matrix is 1 (102)
Lemma 4. ||J(F ′)||2F ≤ 4||J(F )||22 = 4β2.
Proof.
||J(F ′)||2F = ||J(F:2)||2F because J(F ′) is simply J(F:2) augmented with zeros (103)
along the third row and third column.
≤ 4||J(F:2)||2max ||A||F ≤ n||A||max (104)
≤ 4||J(FR)||2max because the principal submatrix just removes entries (105)
and J(F:2) = J (2)(FR).
≤ 4||J(FR)||22 ||A||max ≤ ||A||2 (106)
≤ 4||J(F )||22 Lemma 3 (107)
Lemma 5. ||J2(F ′)||2,1 ≤ 4||J2(F )||2 = 4γ.
Proof.
||J2(F ′)||2,1 = ||J2(F:2)||2,1 because J2(F ′) is J2(F:2) augmented with zeros (108)
=
∑
j
||J2(F:2)·j ||2 by definition (109)
≤
∑
j
||J2(F:2)·j ||1 ||v||2 ≤ ||v||1 (110)
=
∑
ij
|J2(F:2)ij | (111)
≤ 4 max
ij
|J2(F:2)ij | because J2(F:2) is a 2× 2 matrix (112)
= 4||J2(F:2)ij ||max by definition (113)
≤ 4||J2(FR)||2max because the principal submatrix just removes entries (114)
≤ 4||J2(F )||22 Lemma 3 (115)
Theorem 6. ||∇ × F ′(x)||2 ≤
√
8(β2 + Lγ)
Proof.
||∇ × F ′(x)||22 ≤ ||∇||22||F ′(x)||22 ||a× b|| = ||a||||b|| sin θ (116)
= ∆||F ′(x)||22 ||∇||22 = ∇ · ∇ = ∆ (117)
= ∆
( 3∑
i=1
F ′i (x)
2
)
||F ′(x)||22 = F ′(x) · F ′(x) (118)
=
3∑
i=1
∆
(
F ′i (x)
2
)
linearity of∇2 (119)
= 2
3∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
[∂F ′i (x)
∂xj
2
+ F ′i (x)
∂2F ′i (x)
∂x2j
]
evaluating ∆ (120)
= 2
[
||J(F ′(x))||2F +
3∑
j=1
3∑
i=1
F ′i (x)
∂2F ′i (x)
∂x2j
]
by definition (121)
= 2
[
||J(F ′(x))||2F +
3∑
j=1
〈F ′(x), ∂
2F ′(x)
∂x2j
〉
]
write as inner product (122)
≤ 2
[
||J(F ′(x))||2F +
3∑
j=1
||F ′(x)||2||∂
2F ′(x)
∂x2j
||2
]
a · b = ||a||||b|| cos θ (123)
= 2
[
||J(F ′(x))||2F + ||F ′(x)||2
3∑
j=1
||∂
2F ′(x)
∂x2j
||2
]
pull in sum (124)
= 2
[
||J(F ′(x))||2F + ||F ′(x)||2||J2(F ′(x))||2,1
]
by definition (125)
≤ 2(4β2 + 4Lγ) by Lemmas 3, 4, and 5. (126)
A.9 Algorithmic Game Theory: A Venn Diagram
Here, we consider cost-minimization games where Ci(s) is player i’s cost function and C(s) =
∑K
i=1 Ci(s). Player i’s strategy
set is si and s−i represents the strategy sets of all players except player i.
Definition 3 (Smooth Game). A cost-minimization game is (λ,µ)-smooth if for every two outcomes s and s∗,
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) ≤ λ · C(s∗) + µ · C(s). (127)
Definition 4 (Convex Game). A cost-minimization game is convex if Ci(si, s−i) is convex in si ∀i.
Definition 5 (Monotone Game). A cost-minimization game is monotone if the game dynamics are monotone. Here, we assume
all players are running OMoMD.
F =
( ∇s0C0···
∇sKCK
)
(128)
Monotonicity requires that the symmetrized Jacobian of F be positive semidefinite: J + JT  0.
Definition 6 (Socially-Convex Game). A cost-minimization game is socially-convex if
1. There exists λi > 0 such that
∑K
i=1 λi = 1, g(s) =
∑K
i=1 λiCi(s) is convex in s, and
2. Ci(si, s−i) is concave in s−i ∀i.
The definition was originally written for concave.
Theorem 7 (Monotone =⇒ Convex). If a game is monotone, it is also convex.
Proof. For each player i, we show that Ci(si, s−i) is convex in si for any fixed s−i (i.e., s−i = s′−i). The associated map is
given by (128). Let Ki := {s, s′ ∈ K s.t. s−i = s′−i}. Starting with the definition of monotonicity, we have
〈F (s)− F (s′), s− s′〉 ≥ 0 ∀ s, s′ ∈ K (129)
=⇒ 〈F (s)− F (s′), s− s′〉 ≥ 0∀ s, s′ ∈ Ki (130)
=
∑
j
〈Fj(s)− Fj(s′), sj − s′j〉 ≥ 0 ∀ s, s′ ∈ Ki (131)
=
∑
j 6=i
〈Fj(s)− Fj(s′), sj − s′j︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
〉 ≥ 0 ∀ s, s′ ∈ Ki (132)
+ 〈Fi(s)− Fi(s′), si − s′i〉 ≥ 0 ∀ s, s′ ∈ Ki (133)
= 〈∇Ci(s)−∇Ci(s′), si − s′i〉 ≥ 0 ∀ s, s′ ∈ Ki (134)
which is the definition of convexity, so Ci is convex in si.
Theorem 8 (Socially-Convex =⇒ Convex). Lemma 2.2 in (Even-Dar, Mansour, and Nadav 2009) with convex swapped for
concave.
Theorem 9 (Socially-Convex =⇒ λ−Monotone). A game that is socially-convex with parameters λ implies a scaling of the
game with the same parameters that is monotone (credit to Peng Shi).
Proof. Let C ′i = λiCi and let J
′ be the Jacobian of the map, F ′, corresponding to C ′i (128). In addition, define the following
matrices
1. D such that Dii = λi ∂
2Ci
∂s2i
and Dij = 0 ∀i 6= j.
2. Gk is such that ∀i Gkik = Gkki = 0 and ∀i 6= k, j 6= k, Gkij = λk ∂
2Ck
∂sisj
.
3. H is the Hessian of g(s) =
∑
k λkCk(s) (i.e., Hij =
∑
k λk
∂2Ck
∂sisj
).
Note that D, −Gk, and H are all positive semidefinite matrices. This follows from the fact that player costs are convex in their
own strategies, concave in other players’ strategies, and the socially-convex condition respectively.
Continuing the proof, for every i 6= j,
(D −
∑
k
Gk +H)ij = 0−
∑
k 6=i,j
λk
∂2Ck
∂sisj
+
∑
k
λk
∂2Ck
∂sisj
(135)
= λi
∂2Ci
∂sisj
+ λj
∂2Cj
∂sisj
(136)
= (J ′ + J
′T )ij . (137)
Moreover, for every i = j,
(D −
∑
k
Gk +H)ii =
∂2Ci
∂s2i
−
∑
k 6=i
λk
∂2Ck
∂s2i
+
∑
k
λk
∂2Ck
∂s2i
(138)
= 2λi
∂2Ci
∂s2i
(139)
= (J ′ + J
′T )ii. (140)
Therefore, (J + J
′T ) = D −∑kGk +H . Each of the matrices (D,Gk, H) is positive semidefinite, therefore (J + J ′T )  0,
hence F ′ is monotone.
a. Smooth The following cost-minimization game is ( 12 ,
1
2 )-smooth.
C1 = C2 = − cos(r)− cos(c) (141)
Proof.
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = − cos(r∗)− cos(c)− cos(r)− cos(c∗) (142)
≤ λ · C(s∗) = − cos(r∗)− cos(c∗) (143)
+ µ · C(s) = − cos(r)− cos(c) (144)
= − cos(r∗)− cos(c)− cos(r)− cos(c∗) (145)
This game is not convex, therefore, it is neither monotone nor socially-convex.
b. Smooth, Convex Consider the following cost-minimization game.
C1 = r
2(sin(c) + 1.25) (146)
C2 = c
2(sin(r) + 1.25) (147)
This game is (10, 0)-smooth.
Proof.
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = r
∗2(sin(c) + 1.25) + c∗2(sin(r) + 1.25) (148)
≤ 2.25(r∗2 + c∗2) (149)
λ · C(s∗) = 10[r∗2(sin(c∗) + 1.25) + c∗2(sin(r∗) + 1.25)] (150)
≥ 2.5(r∗2 + c∗2) (151)
2.25(r∗2 + c∗2) ≤ 2.5(r∗2 + c∗2) (152)
Clearly, C1 is convex in r and C2 is convex in c, therefore the game is convex.
The corresponding map is not monotone.
Proof.
F =
( 2r(sin(c)+1.25)
2c(sin(r)+1.25)
)
(153)
J = 2
( sin(c)+1.25 r cos(c)
c cos(r) sin(r)+1.25
)
(154)
Js = 2
( sin(c)+1.25 r2 cos(c)+ c2 cos(r)
r
2 cos(c)+
c
2 cos(r) sin(r)+1.25
)
(155)
Js
∣∣∣
r=c=−pi4
= 2
( −√22 +1.25 −pi4 cos(−pi4 )
−pi4 cos(−pi4 ) −
√
2
2 +1.25
)
  0 (156)
C1 is not concave with respect to c. Likewise, C2 is not concave with respect to r. Therefore, this game is not socially-convex.
c. Smooth, Convex, Monotone Consider the following cost-minimization game.
C1 = r
2 + c2 (157)
C2 = r
2 + c2 (158)
This game is ( 12 ,
1
2 )-smooth.
Proof.
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = r
∗2 + c2 + r2 + c∗2 (159)
λ · C(s∗) = r∗2 + c∗2 (160)
µ · C(s) = r2 + c2 (161)
r∗2 + c2 + r2 + c∗2 ≤ r∗2 + c2 + r2 + c∗2 (162)
Clearly, C1 is convex in r and C2 is convex in c, therefore the game is convex.
The corresponding map is monotone.
Proof.
F =
(
2r
2c
)
(163)
J = Js =
(
2 0
0 2
)  0 (164)
C1 is not concave with respect to c. Likewise, C2 is not concave with respect to r. Therefore, this game is not socially-convex.
d. Smooth, Convex, Socially-Convex Consider the following cost-minimization game (inspired by modified Tail Drop policy
in routing networks) over (r, c) ∈ (0, 1]2 = K.
C1 = −1
2
(
r
r + c
) (165)
C2 = − c
r + c
(166)
This game is ( 12 ,−1)-smooth.
Proof.
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = −
1
2
(
r∗
r∗ + c
)− c
∗
r + c∗
(167)
≤ 0 over K (168)
µ · C(s∗) = 1− 1
2
(
r
r + c
) ≥ 1
2
(169)
λ · C(s∗) = −1
2
(1− 1
2
(
r
r + c
)) ≥ −1
2
(170)
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) ≤ 0 ≤ µ · C(s∗) + λ · C(s∗) (171)
C1 is convex in r over K and C2 is convex in c over K, therefore the game is convex.
Proof.
∂2C1
r2
=
c
(r + c)3
≥ 0 over K (172)
∂2C2
c2
=
2r
(r + c)3
≥ 0 over K (173)
The corresponding map is not monotone.
Proof.
F = − 1
(r + c)2
( c
2
r
)
(174)
J =
1
(r + c)3
(
c c−r2
r−c 2r
)
(175)
Js =
1
(r + c)3
( c r−c4
r−c
4 2r
)
(176)
Det(Js) = 2rc− 1
16
(r − c)2 (177)
Det(Js)|r=0.01,c=1 = −0.041 ≤ 0 (178)
The determinant of Js is negative over a subset of the domain (e.g., r ≤ 0.01, c = 1), therefore, Js is not positive semidefinite.
Hence, F is not monotone.
Let λ1 = 23 and λ2 =
1
3 . Then λ1C1 + λ2C2 = − 13 , which is convex in (r, c). Also, C1 is concave with respect to c and C2 is
concave with respect to r, therefore, this game is socially-convex.
Proof.
∂2C1
∂c2
= − r
(r + c)3
≤ 0 over K (179)
∂2C2
∂r2
= − 2c
(r + c)3
≤ 0 over K (180)
e. Smooth, Convex, Monotone, Socially-Convex Consider the following cost-minimization game.
C1 = r (181)
C2 = c (182)
This game is (1, 0)-smooth.
Proof.
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = r
∗ + c∗ (183)
λ · C(s∗) = r∗ + c∗ (184)
r∗ + c∗ ≤ r∗ + c∗ (185)
Clearly, C1 is convex in r and C2 is convex in c, therefore the game is convex.
The corresponding map is monotone.
Proof.
F =
(
1
1
)
(186)
J = Js =
(
0 0
0 0
)  0 (187)
Let λ1 = λ2 = 12 . Then λ1C1 + λ2C2 =
1
2 (r + c), which is convex in (r, c). Also, C1 is concave with respect to c and C2 is
concave with respect to r, therefore, this game is socially-convex.
f. Convex Consider the following cost-minimization game.
C1 = r
2 +
r
c2 + 14
− 9
5
c (188)
C2 = c
2 +
c
r2 + 14
− 9
5
r (189)
This game is not smooth.
Proof.
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = r
∗ + c∗ (190)
λ · C(s∗) = r∗ + c∗ (191)
r∗ + c∗ ≤ r∗ + c∗ (192)
C1 is convex in r and C2 is convex in c, therefore the game is convex.
The corresponding map is not monotone.
Proof.
F =
( 2r+ 1c2+ 1
4
2c+ 1
r2+ 1
4
)
(193)
J = Js =
( 2 − 2c(c2+ 1
4
)2
− 2r
(r2+ 1
4
)2
2
)
(194)
Js
∣∣∣
r=c= 14
=
(
2 −5.12
−5.12 2
)
  0 (195)
This game is not socially-convex because C1 is not concave with respect to c and likewise for C2 and r. For example,
C1(r = 1, c) = 1 +
1
c2+ 14
− 95c is not concave with respect to c.
g. Convex, Monotone Consider the following cost-minimization game.
C1 = r
2 + c2 − 2 (196)
C2 = r
2 + c2 + r + c− 2 (197)
This game is not smooth.
Proof. Consider (r, c) = (1,−1) and (r∗, c∗) = (−1, 1).
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = 2 (198)
µ · C(s) = 0 (199)
λ · C(s∗) = 0 (200)
2 ≤ 0 (201)
C1 is convex in r and C2 is convex in c, therefore the game is convex.
The corresponding map is monotone.
Proof.
F =
(
2r
2c+1
)
(202)
J = Js =
(
2 0
0 2
)  0 (203)
This game is not socially-convex because C1 is not concave with respect to c and likewise for C2 and r.
h. Convex, Socially-Convex Consider the following cost-minimization game (inspired by modified Tail Drop policy in routing
networks) over (r, c) ∈ (0, 1]2 = K.
C1 = −1
2
(
r
r + c
) +
3
4
(204)
C2 = − c
r + c
(205)
This game is not smooth.
Proof. Consider (r, c) = (1, 1) and (r∗, c∗) = (12 ,
1
2 ).
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) =
1
4
(206)
µ · C(s∗) = 0 (207)
λ · C(s∗) = 0 (208)
1
4  
≤ 0 (209)
C1 is convex in r over K and C2 is convex in c over K, therefore the game is convex.
Proof.
∂2C1
r2
=
c
(r + c)3
≥ 0 over K (210)
∂2C2
c2
=
2r
(r + c)3
≥ 0 over K (211)
The corresponding map is not monotone.
Proof.
F = − 1
(r + c)2
( c
2
r
)
(212)
J =
1
(r + c)3
(
c c−r2
r−c 2r
)
(213)
Js =
1
(r + c)3
( c r−c4
r−c
4 2r
)
(214)
Det(Js) = 2rc− 1
16
(r − c)2 (215)
Det(Js)|r=0.01,c=1 = −0.041 ≤ 0 (216)
The determinant of Js is negative over a subset of the domain (e.g., r ≤ 0.01, c = 1), therefore, Js is not positive semidefinite.
Hence, F is not monotone.
Let λ1 = 23 and λ2 =
1
3 . Then λ1C1 + λ2C2 =
1
6 , which is convex in (r, c). Also, C1 is concave with respect to c and C2 is
concave with respect to r, therefore, this game is socially-convex.
Proof.
∂2C1
∂c2
= − r
(r + c)3
≤ 0 over K (217)
∂2C2
∂r2
= − 2c
(r + c)3
≤ 0 over K (218)
i. Convex, Monotone, Socially-Convex Consider the following cost-minimization game.
C1 = r
2 − 1 (219)
C2 = c
2 + r + c− 1 (220)
This game is not smooth.
Proof. Consider (r, c) = (1,−1) and (r∗, c∗) = (−1, 1).
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = 2 (221)
µ · C(s) = 0 (222)
λ · C(s∗) = 0 (223)
2 ≤ 0 (224)
C1 is convex in r and C2 is convex in c, therefore the game is convex.
The corresponding map is monotone.
Proof.
F =
(
2r
2c+1
)
(225)
J = Js =
(
2 0
0 2
)  0 (226)
Let λ1 = λ2 = 12 . Then λ1C1 + λ2C2 =
1
2 (r
2 + c2 + r + c− 2), which is convex in (r, c). Also, C1 is concave with respect
to c and C2 is concave with respect to r, therefore, this game is socially-convex.
A.10 Concave Games
Several well known concave games are monotone.
Linear Cournot Competition In linear Cournot competition, N firms compete for customers by adjusting the quantity of
goods they produce, xi. Firms pay a cost for producing those goods, ci(xi), which is assumed to be a convex function in xi. The
prices for goods are set by the consumer demand markets according to a price function, p(x) = a− b∑k xk, with a, b > 0. The
firms attempt to maximize their utility or profit functions, ui(x) = xip(x)− ci(xi). Here, we show that the map associated with
the game, F (x) = {−∂u0∂x0 , . . . ,−∂uN∂xN }, is monotone.
First we derive the first and second partial derivatives.
∂ui
∂xi
= p(x)− bxi − ∂ci
∂xi
(227)
∂2ui
∂x2i
= −2b− ∂
2ci
∂x2i
(228)
∂2ui
∂xixj
= −b (229)
These derivatives, in turn, define the Jacobian, Jac(F ), which can be decomposed into a constant matrix with all entires equal to b
and a diagonal matrix consisting of b+ ∂
2ci
∂x2i
. A constant matrix with positive entries b is rank-1 with eigenvalues {Nb}+{0}N−1.
The cost functions, ci, are assumed to be convex, therefore, the diagonal matrix is positive-definite. This implies that the sum of
the two symmetric matrices is positive definite. It follows that F is monotone.
Let v(t) = o+ (x− o)t and dv = (x− o)dt.∫
v:o→x
〈−F (v), dv〉 =
∫ 1
0
∑
i
(a− bvi(t)− b
∑
k
vk(t))(xi − oi)dt−
∑
i
(ci(x)− ci(o)) (230)
=
∑
i
(xi − oi)
∫ 1
0
(a− bvi(t)− b
∑
k
vk(t))dt−
∑
i
ci(x) (231)
=
∑
i
(xi − oi)
∫ 1
0
(a− boi − b(xi − oi)t− b
∑
k
ok + (xk − ok)t)dt−
∑
i
(ci(x)− ci(o)) (232)
=
∑
i
(xi − oi)(at− boit− b(xi − oi) t
2
2
− b
∑
k
okt+ (xk − ok) t
2
2
)
∣∣∣1
0
−
∑
i
(ci(x)− ci(o)) (233)
=
∑
i
(xi − oi)(a− boi − b
2
(xi − oi)− b
∑
k
ok +
1
2
(xk − ok))−
∑
i
(ci(x)− ci(o)) (234)
=
∑
i
(xi − oi)(a− boi + xi
2
− b
∑
k
ok + xk
2
)−
∑
i
(ci(x)− ci(o)) (235)
=
∑
i
xip(zi)− ci(x)−
∑
i
oip(zi)− ci(o) where zi = 1
2
(oi + xi +
∑
k
ok + xk) (236)
So auto-welfare is calculating profits with player specific prices. Specifically, each player’s price is set as a deviation from the
average supply of o and x. If o is set to the origin, zi is half the total market supply except with player i’s supply at full. More
generally, if player i chooses to flood the market with good, xi, auto-welfare computes its contribution to the sum with a lower
price point.
Linear Resource Allocation In a resource allocation game, N users share a communication channel with finite capacity
(e.g., C = 1). Each user i submits a bid, xi ∈ [ > 0, 1], to the communication network which then allocates a fraction of the
communication channel to each user according an allocation function, Mi(x) = xi/
∑
k xk. Each user plays to maximize its
utility, ui(x) = ψi(Mi(x))− αixi, with αi > 0. Here, we consider a simplified value function, ψi(z) = βz, with β > 0 and
show that the map associated with the game, F (x) = {−∂u0∂x0 , . . . ,−∂uN∂xN }, is monotone.
First we derive the first and second partial derivatives.
∂Mi(x)
∂xi
=
1∑
k xk
[
1− xi∑
k xk
]
(237)
∂Mi(x)
∂xj
=
1∑
k xk
[
0− xi∑
k xk
]
(238)
∂2Mi(x)
∂x2i
= − 1
(
∑
k xk)
2
[
2− 2xi∑
k xk
]
(239)
∂2Mi(x)
∂xixj
= − 1
(
∑
k xk)
2
[
1− 2xi∑
k xk
]
(240)
∂2ui
∂x2i
= β
∂2Mi(x)
∂x2i
(241)
∂2ui
∂xixj
= β
∂2Mi(x)
∂xixj
(242)
These derivatives, in turn, define the Jacobian, Jac(F ), which can be decomposed into a rank-1 matrix, M , with constant rows
and an identity matrix, IN . Let zi = xi/
∑
k xk ∈ (0, 1].
Jac(F )ij =
β
(
∑
k xk)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
[
1− 2zi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mij
+ I(i = j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IN
]
(243)
We can prove Jac(F ) is monotone by showing 12 (Jac(F ) + Jac(F )
T )  0. As a first step, we’ll lower bound the eigenvalues
of a symmetrized M .
M
(s)
ij =
1
2
(M +MT )ij = 1− (zi + zj) is at most a rank-2 matrix (244)
=⇒ λ(M (s)) = {λlo, λhi}+ {0}N−2 (245)
Tr(M (s)) = λlo + λhi = N − 2 (246)
||M (s)||1 = ||M (s)||∞ = |1− 2zi|+
∑
j 6=i
|1− (zi + zj)| (247)
= |1− 2zi|+
∑
j 6=i
1− (zi + zj) zi, zj > ,
∑
k
zk = 1 =⇒ zi + zj < 1 (248)
= |1− 2zi|+ (N − 2)(1− zi) ≤ N − 1 (249)
ρ(M (s)) = ||M (s)||2 ≤
√
||M (s)||1||M (s)||∞ = N − 1 Holder’s inequality (250)
Assume minλ(M (s)) = λlo < −1 =⇒ maxλ(M (s)) = λhi > N − 1 contradicts ρ(M (s)) (251)
=⇒ minλ(M (s)) ≥ −1 (252)
The eigenvalues of M (s) are lower bounded by −1, therefore, the eigenvalues of the sum of M (s) and an identity matrix are
lower bounded by 0.
J (s) =
1
2
(Jac(F ) + Jac(F )2) =
β
(
∑
k xk)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
[
M (s) + 1N
]
(253)
=⇒ minλ(J (s)) ≥ 0 (254)
=⇒ F is monotone√ (255)
Next, we’ll compare welfare and auto-welfare. For the moment, consider welfare with αi = 0:
W =
∑
i
ui = β
∑
i
xi∑
k xk
= β. (256)
Notice that without αi, welfare regret,
∑
tW (xt)−W (uT ), is identically zero and is a pointless quantity to maximize. If we
include αi,
W =
∑
i
ui = β −
∑
i
αixi, (257)
which has a simple closed-form solution for any αi > 0: xi = . This result is independent of the parameters of the utility
functions, β and αi. Next, we’ll compute auto-welfare to contrast. Let v(t) = o+ (x− o)t and dv = (x− o)dt. The critical
component of auto-welfare is the path integral.∫
v:o→x
〈−F (v), dv〉 =
∫ 1
0
∑
i
( β∑
k vk(t)
[
1− vi(t)∑
k vk(t)
]
− αi
)
(xi − oi)dt (258)
=
∑
i
∫ 1
0
β∑
k vk(t)
[
1− vi(t)∑
k vk(t)
]
(xi − oi)dt−
∑
i
∫ 1
0
αi(xi − oi)dt (259)
=
∑
i
∫ 1
0
β(xi − oi)∑
k ok + (xk − ok)t
[
1− oi + (xi − oi)t∑
k ok + (xk − ok)t
]
dt−
∑
i
αi(xi − oi) (260)
=
∑
i
∫ 1
0
β(xi − oi)∑
k ok + t
∑
k(xk − ok)
[
1− oi + t(xi − oi)∑
k ok + t
∑
k(xk − ok)
]
dt−
∑
i
αi(xi − oi) (261)
=
∑
i
β(xi − oi)
∫ 1
0
1
so + t(sx − so)
[
1− oi + t(xi − oi)
so + t(sx − so)
]
dt−
∑
i
αi(xi − oi) (262)
Breaking apart the left integrand, we first compute the following.∫ 1
0
1
so + t(sx − so)dt =
ln(so + t(sx − so))
sx − so
∣∣∣1
0
=
ln(sx/so)
sx − so (263)
We’ll use integration by parts on the other part. Let u = oi + t(xi − oi), dv = (so + t(sx − so))−2dt, v = − 1sx−so (so +
t(sx − so))−1, and du = xi − oidt.∫ 1
0
oi + t(xi − oi)
(so + t(sx − so))2 dt =
∫ 1
0
udv = uv
∣∣∣1
0
−
∫ 1
0
vdu (264)
uv
∣∣∣1
0
= − oi + t(xi − oi)
(sx − so)(so + t(sx − so))
∣∣∣1
0
(265)
=
oi
so(sx − so) −
xi
sx(sx − so)) (266)
−
∫ 1
0
vdu =
∫ 1
0
1
sx − so (so + t(sx − so))
−1(xi − oi)dt (267)
=
xi − oi
sx − so
∫ 1
0
1
so + t(sx − so)dt (268)
=
xi − oi
sx − so
ln(sx/so)
sx − so (269)
Combining the two results, we find∫
v:o→x
〈−F (v), dv〉 =
∑
i
β(xi − oi)
[ ln(sx/so)
sx − so (1−
xi − oi
sx − so ) +
xi
sx(sx − so) −
oi
so(sx − so)
]
−
∑
i
αi(xi − oi) (270)
=
∑
i
β
xi − oi
sx − so
[
ln(sx/so)(1− xi − oi
sx − so ) +
xi
sx
− oi
so
]
−
∑
i
αi(xi − oi) (271)
= β ln(sx/so)
∑
i
xi − oi
sx − so − β ln(sx/so)
∑
i
(
xi − oi
sx − so )
2 + β
∑
i
xi − oi
sx − so
[xi
sx
− oi
so
]
−
∑
i
αi(xi − oi)
(272)
= β ln(sx/so)
(
1− ||x− o||
2
2
(sx − so)2
)
+ β
∑
i
xi − oi
sx − so
[xi
sx
− oi
so
]
−
∑
i
αi(xi − oi). (273)
Let W ao = 0 and o = uT , then
W a(x) = β ln(sx/suT )
(
1− ||x− uT ||
2
2
(sx − suT )2
)
+ β
∑
i
xi − uT,i
sx − suT
[xi
sx
− uT,i
suT
]
−
∑
i
αi(xi − uT,i) (274)
Finding a closed-form solution for a global optimizer of (274) seems daunting not to mention the fact that the optimizer,
uT , appears in the optimization function. Fortunately, Theorem 4 states that a global optimizer of (274) is also a solution the
corresponding VI(F,X = [, 1]N ). If we assume x = uT lies in the interior of X , then F (uT ) = 0.
F (x) = β
1∑
k xk
(1− xi∑
k xk
)− αi = 0 =⇒ xi = sx(1− αi sx
β
) (275)
sx =
∑
i
xi = sx
∑
i
(1− αi sx
β
) =⇒ sx
[∑
i αi
β
sx + (1−N)
]
= 0 =⇒ sx = 0 or β(N − 1)∑
i αi
(276)
Combining the two results, we find that the global optimizer is
uT,i =
β(N − 1)∑
k αk
(
1− αi∑
k αk
(N − 1)
)
. (277)
As the cost coefficients, αi, grow relative to the revenue coefficients, β, the optimal bid size drops. Also, as the number of
users, N , increases, the optimal bid size increases, albeit with diminishing returns. Hence, auto-welfare has a rich dependence on
the utility parameters and number of users, which is very different from the complete independence given by welfare.
The linear lower bound on auto-welfare regret is given by
regretWa = −regret1 ≥ 〈−F (x), x− uT 〉 (278)
=
∑
i
[
βγi
xi∑
k xk
− αixi
]
−
∑
i
[
βγi
uT,i∑
k xk
− αiuT,i
]
, γi = (1− xi∑
k xk
) (279)
=
∑
i
uγi (x)−
∑
i
uγi (uT ) (280)
where uγi is the original utility function, ui, with “revenues” (ψi(Mi(x))) reweighted by γi. In this case, auto-welfare regret
is actually computing standard welfare with reweighted “revenues”. High revenues are weighted lower and low revenues are
weighted higher, which naturally encourages a more even distribution of resources.
Congestion Control Protocols Similar utility functions can be used to model a congestion control protocol with a tail-drop
policy. In this game, a router drops packets if the total number of packets exceeds the network capacity (e.g., C = 1). In this
case, the utility functions are defined piecewise:
ui(x) =
{
xi
∑
k xk ≤ 1
β xi∑
k xk
− (β − 1)xi
∑
k xk > 1
(281)
For
∑
k xk ≤ 1, the utility functions are linear, thus the Jacobian of the associated game map, F (x) = {−∂u0∂x0 , . . . ,−∂uN∂xN }, is a
zero matrix, which is positive semidefinite. Monotonicity for the second case follows the same proof as for the linear resource
allocation game above.
A.11 Machine Learning Network Motivation
The example in the paper demonstrates our proposed no-regret algorithm on a cloud-based machine learning network. Our
network is motivated by expectations of the next era of machine learning. Data is often the difference between a high performing
model and a mediocre one; for some data hungry models (e.g., deep learning), Big Data launches them to state-of-the-art results.
We expect Big Data to drive a mature digital supply chain capable of supporting an economy where producers provide data for
consumers (i.e., machine learning models) to consume. Unlike the present, this commodity will not be transferred into local
storage for consumption on personal machines; rather, it will be transmitted in batches, immediately consumed for training, and
discarded to allow room for the next batch. Our model of a cloud-based machine learning network (MLN) is trivially adapted
from the service oriented internet (SOI) model proposed in (Nagurney and Wolf 2014). In the original SOI model, service
providers (e.g., Netflix, Amazon) stream content (e.g., movies, music). In our MLN model, service providers (e.g., Twitter,
Wikipedia) stream machine learning data. Service providers control the quantity of data (i.e., # of samples× # of features) flowing
through the market. Network providers charge service providers a fee for transmitting their data to consumers. The price different
consumer markets are willing to pay service providers to stream data over a network of a certain quality is given by demand
functions, price(quantity,quality). Given these relationships, service providers and network providers attempt to maximize their
profits by varying their respective controls (quantity,quality) over the network. These relationships are parameterized so that
we can instantiate ten five-firm networks by drawing parameters from uniform distributions over predefined ranges (code on
github.com/*****).
A.12 GTD Algorithms
The GTD update rules are
yt+1 = yt + αt(b−Aθt −Myt) (282)
θt+1 = θt + αt(A
T yt) (283)
where M = I or M is a covariance matrix. Either way, M is symmetric positive definite.
These update rules can be derived from a 2-player game with appropriate agent loss functions, f (i). For example, if
f (1)(y, θ) = −yT (b−Aθ) + 1
2
yTMy (284)
f (2)(y, θ) = −θTAT y, (285)
then OMoD with F = [∇yf (1),∇θf (2)] gives the same updates as GTD.
F =
(My+Aθ−b
−AT y
)
(286)
=
(
M A
−AT 0
)( y
θ
)
+
(−b
0
)
(287)
= Jx+ d (288)
Js =
(
M 0
0 0
)
(289)
zTJsz =
(
zT1 z
T
2
)(
M 0
0 0
)(
z1
z2
)
(290)
= zT1 Mz1  λminI  0 (291)
Therefore, F is strongly monotone with parameter λmin.
By A.5, the corresponding path integral loss that these dynamics bound is
f(x) =
1
2
[xTJTx+ xT (J − JT )o− oTJT o]
+ dT (x− o) (292)
=
1
2
(yTMy − yT0 My0) + yTAθ0 − yT0 Aθ − bT (y − y0) (293)
=
1
2
(yTMy − yT0 My0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
y-growth
(294)
− yT (b−Aθ0) + yT0 (b−Aθ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
y-alignment
(295)
In the GTD algorithms, y was originally introduced as an auxiliary variable to estimate E[ρδφ] = b−Aθ. If we let θ0 = θ,
and both y-growth < 0 and y-alignment > 0, this means that y is a better estimate of b−Aθ than y0. This result is reassuring
because it means that the GTD algorithm is naturally ensuring a bound on the error of this estimate, which is crucial to solving
the “double sampling” problem. The GTD algorithm was originally developed with the goal of accurately estimating b−Aθ,
however, the algorithm’s development was motivated out of intuition. We hope this perspective provides a stronger mathematical
explanation.
A.13 Affine Wasserstein GANs
The minimax objective is
min
G
max
d
V (G, d) = Ex∼pdata(x) [d
Tx]− Ez∼pz(z)[dTGz] (296)
where x ∈ Rn, z ∈ Rm, d ∈ Rn, G ∈ Rn×m.
For simplicity of exhibition, we will estimate the expectations with a single sample x ∼ pdata(x) and z ∼ pz(z), however, the
result applies to batches as well. The minimax objective simplifies to
min
G
max
d
V (G, d) = dT (x−Gz) (297)
=
∑
i
di(xi −
∑
j
Gijzj). (298)
Let g =

G11
...
G1m
Gi1
...
Gim
...

be a flattened version of the matrix G. Also, let A =

z1 0 · · ·
zj 0 · · ·
zm 0 · · ·
0 z1 · · ·
0 zj · · ·
0 zm · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
 ∈ R
mn×n. Then,
F =

−d1z1
−d1zj
−d1zm
...
−dizj∑
j G1jzj − x1∑
j Gijzj − xi∑
j Gnjzj − xn

(299)
=
(
0mn×mn −A
AT 0n×n
)(
g
d
)
+
(
0
−x
)
(300)
= Jγ + b (301)
Js =
(
0 0
0 0
)  0 (302)
Therefore, F is monotone. If G and d are regularized with α|| · ||22, then F is strongly monotone with parameter α.
By A.5, the corresponding path integral loss that these dynamics bound is
f(x) =
1
2
[xTJTx+ xT (J − JT )o− oTJT o] + bT (x− o) (303)
= xTJo+ bT (x− o) (304)
= dT (AT g0)− dT0 (AT g)− (d− d0)Tx (305)
= dT (G0z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
G0-tricks-d
− dT0 (Gz)︸ ︷︷ ︸
G-tricks-d0
− (d− d0)Tx︸ ︷︷ ︸
d-realer-than-d0
(306)
= V (d0, G)− V (d,G0). (307)
If we let d0 = d, then this loss is minimized if G tricks d better than G0 tricks d; i.e., the generator, G, is an improvement over
G0. Alternatively, if we let G0 = G, then this loss models how much the discriminator, d, has improved over d0.
A.14 Path Integral Loss for Minimax Games
min
x1
max
x2
V (x1, x2) (308)
dV = 〈 ∂V
∂x1
, dx1〉+ 〈 ∂V
∂x2
, dx2〉 (309)
f(x) =
∫
z:o→x
〈F (z), dz〉 (310)
=
∫
z:o→x
〈 ∂V
∂z1
, dz1〉+ 〈− ∂V
∂z2
, dz2〉 (311)
=
∫
z1:o1→x1
z2:o2→o2
dV −
∫
z1:o1→o1
z2:o2→x2
dV (312)
= V (x1, o2)− V (o1, o2)− V (o1, x2) + V (o1, o2) (313)
= V (x1, o2)− V (o1, x2) (314)
